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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
IN RE GRANT ANDERSON
on motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
No. 93-8312. Decided May 2, 1994
Per Curiam.
Pro se petitioner Grant Anderson seeks an extraordi-
nary writ pursuant to 28 U. S. C. 2241 and requests
permission to proceed in forma pauperis under this
Court's Rule 39. Pursuant to Rule 39.8, we deny
petitioner leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Peti-
tioner is allowed until May 23, 1994, within which to
pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38 and to submit
his petition in compliance with this Court's Rule 33.
For the reasons explained below, we also direct the
Clerk of the Court not to accept any further petitions for
extraordinary writs from petitioner unless he pays the
docketing fee required by Rule 38 and submits his
petitions in compliance with Rule 33.
Petitioner is a prolific filer in this Court. In the last
three years alone, he has filed 22 separate petitions and
motions, including 3 petitions for certiorari, 6 motions
for reconsideration, and 13 petitions for extraordinary
writs. Thirteen of these petitions and motions have
been filed this Term. We have denied all of the peti-
tions and motions without recorded dissent. We have
also denied petitioner leave to proceed in forma paupe-
ris, pursuant to Rule 39.8, on the last three occasions
that he has submitted petitions for extraordinary relief.
Like the majority of his previous submissions to this
Court, the instant petition for habeas corpus relates to
the denial of petitioner's various postconviction motions
by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. The
current petition merely repeats arguments that we have
considered previously and not found worthy of plenary
review. Like the three petitions in which we denied
petitioner leave to proceed in forma pauperis, moreover,
the instant petition is patently frivolous.
The bulk of petitioner's submissions have been
petitions for extraordinary writs, and we limit our
sanction accordingly. We have imposed similar sanctions
in three prior cases. See In re Demos, 500 U. S. 16
(1991); In re Sindram, 498 U. S. 177 (1991); In re
McDonald, 489 U. S. 180 (1989). For the reasons
discussed in these cases, we feel compelled to bar
petitioner from filing any further requests for extraordi-
nary relief. As we concluded in Sindram:
-The goal of fairly dispensing justice . . . is compro-
mised when the Court is forced to devote its limited
resources to the processing of repetitious and
frivolous requests. Pro se petitioners have a greater
capacity than most to disrupt the fair allocation of
judicial resources because they are not subject to the
financial considerations-filing fees and attorney's
fees-that deter other litigants from filing frivolous
petitions. The risks of abuse are particularly acute
with respect to applications for extraordinary relief,
since such petitions are not subject to any time
limitations and, theoretically, could be filed at any
time without limitation. In order to prevent frivo-
lous petitions for extraordinary relief from unsettling
the fair administration of justice, the Court has a
duty to deny in forma pauperis status to those
individuals who have abused the system.- 498
U. S., at 179-180 (citation omitted).
So long as petitioner qualifies under this Court's Rule
39 and does not similarly abuse the privilege, he
remains free to file in forma pauperis requests for relief
other than an extraordinary writ. See id., at 180. In
the meantime, however, today's order -will allow this
Court to devote its limited resources to the claims of
petitioners who have not abused our process.- In re
Sassower, 510 U. S. ___, ___ (1993) (slip op., at 3).
It is so ordered.
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Blackmun
joins, dissenting.
During my years of service on the Court, I have not
detected any threat to the integrity of its processes, or
its ability to administer justice fairly, caused by frivo-
lous petitions, whether filed by paupers or by affluent
litigants. Three years ago I expressed the opinion that
the cost of administering sanctions such as that imposed
on this petitioner would exceed any perceptible adminis-
trative benefit. In re Amendment to Rule 39, 500 U. S.
13, 15 (1991). Any minimal savings in time or photo-
copying costs, it seemed to me, did not justify the
damage that occasional orders denying in forma pauperis
status would cause to -the symbolic interest in preserv-
ing equal access to the Court for both the rich and the
poor.- Ibid. Three years' experience under this Court's
Rule 39.8 leaves me convinced that the dissenters in the
cases the Court cites had it right. See In re Demos, 500
U. S. 16, 17-19 (1991); In re Sindram, 498 U. S. 177,
180-183 (1991); In re McDonald, 489 U. S. 180, 185-188
(1989). See also Day v. Day, 510 U. S. ___, ___ (1993)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Again I respectfully dissent.